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General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp.: Prejudgment
Interest - The Rule Rather than the Exception
in Patent Infringement Awards
Although prejudgment interest has been awarded infrequently and
inconsistently in the past in patent infringement cases, the Supreme
Court's holding in GeneralMotors Corp. v. Devex Corp. I changes that result.
In Devex, the Court determined that 35 U.S.C. Section 2842 establishes as
a general rule that prejudgment interest be awarded in addition to dam-
ages in patent infringement cases.3 If exceptional circumstances would
make an award of prejudgment interest undesirable, however, the lower
courts would still have the discretion to deny it. 4 The decision clarifies
those circumstances under which prejudgment interest should be
awarded by the lower courts, but does not discuss what special circum-
stances would prevent it from being awarded. Nevertheless, it should
help straighten out the inconsistency among the circuits in awarding pre-
judgment interest.
The affirmation of the award of prejudgment interest was the culmi-
nation of many years of litigation in Devex. In 1956, Devex Corporation
filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, and one year later filed a companion suit against Houdaille In-
dustries, Inc.5 Both complaints alleged that a lubricating process used by
General Motors (GM) and Houdaille infringed upon a patent owned by
103 S. Ct. 2058 (1983).
2 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1976). Title 35 of the United States Code contains the general and
permanent laws relating to patents. Section 284, entitled Damages, states:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reason-
able royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with
interest and costs as fixed by the court.
When the damages are not found by a jury, the court shall assess them. In
either event the court may increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed.
The court may receive expert testimony as an aid to the determination of
damages or of what royalty would be reasonable under the circumstances.
3 The term "prejudgment interest" is used to denote the interest on a claim computed
from the time it was originally due until the date of the final judgment. D. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES § 3.5 (1973). "It is the interest on a sum of money which, until the rendering of the
final judgment, has not been declared as damages for the plaintiff." Note, Prj'dgment Interest.
An Element of Damages Not to be Overlooked, 8 CUM. L. REv. 521 (1977).
4 The Court specifically stated, "We do not construe § 284 as requiring the award of
prejudgment interest whenever infringement is found . . . and in our view it leaves the court
some discretion in awarding prejudgment interest." Devex, 103 S. Ct. at 2063.
5 Id at 2059-60.
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
Devex 6 (hereinafter the Henricks patent). The cases were consolidated
in order to adjudicate the validity of the Henricks patent. The district
court held the patent invalid, but the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded, finding it valid, but in a narrower context than
had been set forth. 7
The suit against GM was transferred to the U.S.'District Court for
the District of Delaware, and the Houdaille suit remained in the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. 8 The Delaware dis-
trict court found for GM, holding that Devex had not met its burden of
proof in establishing the validity of its patent. 9 The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that GM had infringed the patented pro-
cess.10 The issue of the proper damages to be awarded for infringement
arose for the first time on remand,' l where the report of the Special
Master set damages at $12.2 million.' 2 The Master used Devex's indus-
try-wide offer to license for a royalty of 0.75 percent of the value of the
products manufactured using the patent and multiplied it by the value
of GM's parts which infringed the patent, arriving at a figure of
$8,607,183.70. The Master then reduced that figure by one-third to $5.7
million, finding that the parties would have so reduced it in subsequent
negotiations. The Master also held that GM would have agreed to pay
interest for the use of the royalty monies over the years and increased the
damages figure by $6.5 million, resulting, in a final. figure of $12.2 mil-
lion. 13 The Master did not find GM's infringement to be such as to per-
6 Claim 4 of Reissue Patent No. 24017 (the Henricks patent) covers in part:
The process of working ferrous metal which comprises forming on the surface of
the metal a phosphate coating and superimposing thereon a fixed film of a com-
position comprising a solid meltable organic binding material containing distrib-
uted there through a solid inorganic compound meltable at a temperature below
the melting point of the ferrous metal phosphate of said coating and having a
hardness not exceeding 5 on the Mohs' hardness scale, and thereafter deforming
the metal.
Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 494 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (D. Del. 1980), a Id, 667 F.2d
347 (1981), afd, 103 S. Ct. 2058 (1983).
The patent expired in 1969; thus, only damages issues, as opposed to injunctive relief, were
before the Court. Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 667 F.2d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 198 1), aftd,
103 S. Ct. 2058 (1983).
7 Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 321 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
971 (1964).
8 The companion suit was tried separately. See Devex Corp. v. Houdaille Industries, Inc.,
148 U.S.P.Q. 74 (N.D. I1. 1965), reversed, 382 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1967). The case was subse-
quently settled out of court.
9 Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 316 F. Supp. 1376 (D. Del. 1970), rev'd, 467 F.2d
257 (3d Cir. 1972),remanded, 494 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1980), affd, 667 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1981),
affd, 103 S. Ct. 2058 (1983).
10 Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 467 F.2d 257 (3d Cir. 1972), remanded, 494 F.
Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1980), affd, 667 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1981), af d, 103 S. Ct. 2058 (1983).
Devex, 494 F. Supp. at 1372.
12 Id. at 1373. A presumption of validity normally attaches to a Master's factual findings.
Unless such findings are shown to be clearly erroneous, they must be accepted. Id. FED. R. Civ.
P. 53(e)(2). See 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 53.12[4]-[5] (2d ed.
1982).
1' Devex, 494 F. Supp. at 1372.
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mit an award for multiple damages or attorney's fees. 14
Following objections from both parties as to the amount of damages
allowed by the Master,' 5 the district court refused to reduce Devex's roy-
alty figure by one-third as suggested by the Master, stating that there
was no evidence to indicate that Devex would have accepted such a re-
duced royalty.16 The court held that the Master's refusal to allow multi-
ple damages and attorney's fees was proper since Devex had not shown
sufficient evidence of inequitable dealings by GM, as was usually re-
quired for additional damage awards. 17 Finally, the court upheld the
award of prejudgment interest in order to compensate Devex for the ben-
efit GM received from retaining the use of the royalty monies over the
years, stating that Devex would be undercompensated if the interest
award was not permitted to stand.' 8
The Third Circuit affirmed both the infringement and damages
holdings.19 The court upheld the award of prejudgment interest, finding
that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial judge and that the
award was permitted under Section 284. The court stated that to deny
interest in this case would give the defendant a windfall, and would also
encourage defendants to draw out patent infringement litigation for as
long as possible.2 0
The Supreme Court addressed solely the issue of prejudgment inter-
est and upheld the award.2' Although the courts of appeal had reached
different conclusions as to whether Section 284 incorporated the common
law standard set out in Duplate Corp. v. Triplex Safety Glass,22 which re-
stricted awards of prejudgment interest to cases involving exceptional
circumstances or bad faith, the Supreme Court held that prejudgment
interest should ordinarily be awarded and that there must be special jus-
tification for such an award not to be made. 23
14 Id at 1373.
15 Devex sought a higher royalty rate, stating that the Master should not have used De-
vex's industry-wide offer in 1964 to license Claim 4 at 0.75% of the value of the products manu-
factured as the basis for his calculations. Devex also sought multiple damages and attorney's
fees, as well as damages for GM's use of Claim 4 to produce non-bumper parts. GM asserted
that the Master's royalty assessment was overly generous and that prejudgment interest should
not have been awarded. Id at 1373-79.
16 Id at 1377. The reduction by the Master could not be allowed here without some proof
that Devex would have accepted it. Royalty calculations must be based upon evidence and
cannot be merely speculative. Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 533 F.2d 126 (3d
Cir. 1976).
17 Devex, 494 F. Supp. at 1378.
18 Id at 1379.
19 Devex, 667 F.2d 347.
20 "The only sufferer from such a result would be the prevailing party - the innocent
party." Id at 364 (Footnote omitted).
21 Devex, 103 S. Ct. 2058.
22 298 U.S. 448 (1936).
23 Devex, 103 S. Ct. at 2062-63. Reluctance to award prejudgment interest appears to have
its roots in religious thinking from medieval times when interest was viewed as usurious and evil.
D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.5 (1973); Comment, Prejudgment Interest. Survey and Suggestion,
77 Nw. U. L. REV. 192, 195 (1982).
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The Devex Court stated that there was no warrant for exercising the
Duplate limitation on awards of prejudgment interest, and no basis for
inferring that Congress' adoption of Section 284 incorporated the Duplate
holding. The Court stated
This is not a case in which Congress has reenacted statutory language
that the courts had interpreted in a particular way. . .. The predeces-
sor statute did not contain any reference to interest, and the 1946
amendments specifically added a provision concerning interest in patent
infringement actions. We cannot agree with petitioner that the only sig-
nificance of Congress' express provision for the award of interest was the
incorporation of a common law standard that developed in the absence
of any specific provision concerning interest.
24
After stating that the Duplate standard had not been incorporated
into Section 284, the Court held that prejudgment interest should ordi-
narily be awarded where it is necessary to afford the plaintiff full com-
pensation for the infringement. 25  Prejudgment interest is normally
necessary to fully compensate the patent owner who was deprived of the
use of royalty monies from the time the infringement began. To allow
only an award of damages for royalties would ignore the value of the
foregone use of that money, which, as in this case, can extend over a
number of years.2
6
The Court did not, however, hold that an award of prejudgment
interest must be made in all cases where infringement is found.27 There
may be circumstances where it is appropriate to limit or deny prejudg-
ment interest, but these are now related more to the conduct of the in-
jured party than to that of the infringer. The Court noted that a case
where the patent owner has been responsible for undue delay in litigat-
ing the lawsuit may be an example where limitation or denial should
apply.28 The Court also left open the possibility that there could be
other circumstances which would warrant such treatment, but it refused
to delineate those instances.29
24 Devex, 103 S. Ct. at 2061-62.
25 Id. at 2062.
26 Id at 2063. The district court had specifically addressed this issue, stating that GM
must now be charged a premium for the additional benefit it has enjoyed from
retaining the use of the royalty money over the many years since its first infringe-
ment. To do otherwise would systematically undercompensate patentees and en-
courage their infringers to continue fighting lawsuits long after the disappearance
of any justification for doing so for the sole purpose of gathering in generous
interest money that rightfully belongs to someone else.
Devex, 494 F. Supp. at 1379. See also, Craft, Prjudgment Interest Under 35 U.S C Sectton 284, 64 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'v 266, 290 (1982) (patentee has been damaged to the extent that he has not been
able to use the royalty money).
27 Devex, 103 S. Ct. at 2063.
28 Id The determination whether the plaintiff had unduly delayed prosecution is commit-
ted to the discretion of the trial court and would be reviewable on appeal only for abuse of
discretion. Id , n. 11.
29 "[I1t may be appropriate to limit prejudgment interest, or perhaps even to deny it alto-
gether .... We hold only that prejudgment interest should be awarded under § 284 absent
some justification for withholding such an award." Id at 2063.
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The Duplate decision involved an accounting to the patent owner by
the infringer for sales of patented shatterproof glass. The infringer was
found to have acted in good faith, and the complainant was unable to
prove the actual damages. 30 The Court in Duplate refused to allow pre-
judgment interest, noting that "there are no exceptional circumstances
justifying a departure from what is at least the general rule."' 3 1 The
Duplate Court relied on Tilghman v. Proctor,32 which involved a bill in
equity brought by the owners of a patent against the patent infringers.
Equity courts based damages on the infringer's profits and considered
the profits to be a measure of unliquidated damages, which could not
bear interest until their amount had been judicially determined. 33 De-
parture from this general rule was justified only if there were special cir-
cumstances. 34 In Duplate, however, a reasonable royalty,35 as opposed to
the infringer's profits, had been established for the period of infringe-
ment.36 The Court, extending the scope of Tilghman, held that to be
insufficient to bring the case under the special circumstances exception. 3 7
Therefore, prejudgment interest was not awardable, and interest could
run only from the date damages were set by the court even if a reason-
able royalty had been established by the injured party. 38
The Supreme Court had previously recognized that, in certain cases,
awards of prejudgment interest were essential to achieve justice. These
awards of interest, however, were dependent on the special circumstances
of a particular case, and were the exception rather than the rule even
before Duplate.
30 Id. at 450.
31 Id at 459.
32 125 U.S. 136 (1888).
33 "The profits . . .are the measure of damages, though called profits, they are really
damages, and unliquidated until the decree is made. Interest is not generally allowable upon
unliquidated damages." Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 620, 653 (1872). If the suit was
at law, however, the measure of damages was the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff as
determined by the jury. In a suit in equity, if the gains and profits of the infringer were not
sufficient to compensate the complainant fully, damages sustained could also be recovered if
proven. Birdsell v. Coolidge, 93 U.S. 64, 69 (1876).
34 Mowgy, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) at 653.
35 "A reasonable royalty is the license rate that plaintiff and defendant would have agreed
upon at the time infringement began had they been reasonably and voluntarily negotiating the
license agreement." Trio Process v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 612 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1980). The actual license rate is an important factor in the determination
of a reasonable royalty, at least when those royalties prove or tend to prove an established
royalty. Georgia Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 197 1).
It is possible, however, that the license rate established in the market may have been artificially
depressed by an ongoing infringement. The reasonable royalty rate may be set higher than the
actual license rate if there is evidence submitted to determine that the license rate had been
artificially depressed by the infringement. General Motors Corp. v. Blackmore, 53 F.2d 725,
727 (6th Cir. 1939). For further discussion, see Fitzpatrick, Damages in Trademark and Patent In-
fringement Litigation, 8 AM. PAT. L.A. 29, 40-41 (1980).
36 Dup/ate, 298 U.S. at 459.
37 Id.
38 Id.
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In Clark v. Wooster,39 a suit in equity, the Supreme Court ruled that
the established royalty is the best measure of damages, but further stated
that there could be damages beyond that. 40 Such things as expense and
inconvenience to the plaintiff could be reasons for court-exercised au-
thority to increase damages.4 1 In Miller v. Robertson,42 the plaintiff sued
to recover on a contract for the sale of ore in which all damages had
accrued prior to the demand, leaving nothing dependent on any future
event. The Miller Court stated that while interest was not generally al-
lowed on unliquidated damages, it, or an equivalent element of damages,
could be awarded at the discretion of the court when necessary for fair
compensation.
4 3
In Waite v. United States 4 4 the Court found that interest should have
been awarded to make the compensation complete and in order to "ac-
complish complete justice. ' ' 45 This case involved a suit to recover for
unlicensed use of a patented invention. The liability of the United States
was not disputed, and the United States, while not formally confessing
error, stated its belief that interest should have been allowed. 46 There
was also no dispute that the profits the plaintiffs would have made were
the proper measure of damages. Finally, the Court in Board of Commission-
ers v. United States,47 while denying a request for an award of interest,
stated that interest "is given in response to considerations of fairness. It is
denied where its exaction would be inequitable." 4  This was a case in
which a county had taxed land based on a fee patent that was later can-
celled. The Court noted that the County had every practical justifica-
tion for collecting the tax at the time and refused to apply interest to the
judgment. 49
These cases reveal that the Court recognized the need to be able to
make awards of prejudgment interest in addition to liquidated damages,
but they also show that the Court did not make awards of prejudgment
interest lightly. The Duplate decision reinforced this approach, and subse-
quent statutory provisions were interpreted as strengthening it.
In a 1946 amendment to Title 35 of the United States Code, Section
70 was codified.50 While similar to the pre-1946 common law standard,
39 119 U.S. 322 (1886).
40 Id. at 326.
41 Id.
42 266 U.S. 243 (1924).
43 Id at 258.
44 282 U.S. 508 (1931).
45 Id at 509.
46 Id. at 508.
47 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
48 Id. at 352.
49 Id. at 345.
50 Section 70, entitled "Power of court to grant injunctions; recovery of general damages;
assessment; elements of general damages; increase of damages; limitations; note to Commis-
sioner of suits and judgments rendered," stated in part:
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it eliminated recovery of the patent infringer's profits5' and provided
that a reasonable royalty, together with costs and interest that the court
may allow, should be awarded as recovery of damages. Because the
amendment allowed interest and costs to be fixed by the court, however,
several circuits continued to apply the special circumstances test of the
common law to determine whether interest from the date of the infringe-
ment should be awarded. 52 This had the frequent effect of limiting re-
covery to the amount of the royalties plus interest from the date the
damages were liquidated.
53
In 1952, as part of a revision of Title 35, Sections 6754 and 70 were
The several courts vested with jurisdiction of cases arising under the patent
laws shall have power to grant injunctions according to the course and principles
of courts of equity, to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on
such terms as the court may deem reasonable; and upon a judgment being 'mn-
dered in any case for an infringement the complainant shall be entitled to recover
general damages which shall be due compensation for making, using, or selling
the invention, not less than a reasonable royalty therefor, together with such costs,
and interest, as may be fixed by the court. The court may in its discretion award
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party upon the entry of judgment on
any patent case.
The court shall assess said damages, or cause the same to be assessed, under
its direction and shall have the same power to increase the assessed damages, in its
discretion, as is given to increase the damages found by verdicts in actions in the
nature of actions of trespass upon the case; but recovery shall not be had for any
infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint in
the action.
35 U.S.C. § 70 (1946) (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1976)).
The House Committee on Patents report, subsequently adopted as the report of the Senate
Committee, stated, in part, regarding 35 U.S.C. § 70:
The object of the bill is to make the basis of recovery in patent infringement suits
general damages, that is, any damages the complainant can prove, not less than a
reasonable royalty, together with interest from the time the infringement oc-
curred, rather than profits and damages.
S. Rep. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., repnthedin 1946 CODE CONG. SERV. 1386, 1387.
For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of Section 70, see Craft, supra note 26, at
272-80; Georgia Pacific 446 F.2d at 300-01.
51 Recovery of the infringer's profits reflected the idea that the patent owner should be
able to force the infringer to "disgorge the fruits of the infringement" even if it had caused no
injury to the owner. Determination of the infringer's gain, however, often required lengthy
litigation. Devex, 103 S. Ct. at 2062.
52 See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System v. Zenith Radio Corp., 537 F.2d 896, 897 (7th
Cir. 1976); Wahl v. Carrier Manufacturing Co., 511 F.2d 209, 215 (7th Cir. 1975); Radiator
Specialty Co. v. Micek, 395 F.2d 763, 764 (9th Cir. 1968); Win. Bros. Boiler and Manufacturing
Co. v. Gibson-Stewart Co., 312 F.2d 385, 387 (6th Cir. 1963).
53 See cases cited at note 52.
54 Section 67, entitled "Infringement of patent; damages for," stated:
Damages for the infringement of any patent may be recovered by action on
the case, in the name of the party interested, either as patentee, assignee, or
grantee. And whenever in any such action a verdict is rendered for the plaintiff,
the court may enter judgment thereon for any sum above the amount found by
the verdict as the actual damages sustained, according to the circumstances of the
case, not exceeding three times the amount of such verdict, together with costs.
Section 67 had paralleled the legal remedies while Section 70 paralleled the equitable remedies
available. Craft, supra note 26, at 273. The purpose of the consolidation of Sections 67 and 70
in 1952 was to clarify the statement of the statutes. S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprnted1n 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394, 2403.
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consolidated into the present Section 284, and some minor changes were
made in the language of the section for clarification. In part, Section 284
now states:
Upon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant dam-
ages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less
than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the in-
fringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.
55
In 1964, the Supreme Court addressed the purpose of the consolida-
tion of Sections 67 and 70 in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Co.
(Aro i-),56 a case involving contributory infringement. While the dam-
ages issue was not before the Court, it stated that pursuant to the consoli-
dated statute a claimant could recover for damages, but not for both
damages and the profits of the patent infringer.5 7 The Court did not
address the language of the consolidated statute which refers to interest
as a means of providing adequate compensation for the infringement. As
a result of the Aro II dicta, 58 several lower courts have continued to inter-
pret the award of prejudgment interest as discretionary, and have contin-
ued to strictly apply the special circumstances standard. Several other
courts, however, have viewed Section 284 as giving discretion to the
courts that they had not had earlier.
In Georgia-Pacift Corp. v. US P1'ywood-Champi'on Papers59 the Second
Circuit upheld a decision in which the district court had awarded inter-
est from the date of the last infringement in addition to damages. Geor-
gia-Pacific had requested a declaratory judgment regarding three
patents held by U.S.P. One of the patents was declared valid and was
found to have been infringed. The Court specifically noted that "Con-
gress did not purport to require interest from the dates on which royalties
would normally have been paid,"6 and went on to state that the
"change in statute was intended to grant the trial court its traditional
discretionary power in equity. ' '6' The Second Circuit's decision, al-
though not strictly following the Duplate standard of allowing interest
only from the date damages were fully determined, did not provide com-
plete relief to the injured party. The court recognized this, stating, "In-
deed, USP has a persuasive argument that the equities require GP to pay
interest from the dates on which royalties would have been paid."'6 2 The
55 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1976).
56 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
57 Id at 502.
58 The portion of the opinion dealing with the question of the proper basis for damages
was neither briefed nor argued by the parties. This part of the opinion is preceded by a footnote
stating that it represents the views of only four justices. The fifth justice, who had joined to
form a majority in the other parts of the opinion, did not join in the portion relating to damages
as he did not consider it appropriate to address that issue at the time. Consequently, this por-
tion of the opinion is not binding authority. Craft, supra note 26, at 280-8 1.
59 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
60Id at 301.
61 Id at 302.
62 Id.
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court, however, continued to view the award of interest as discretionary
in the trial court and found no abuse of discretion.6 3
The Third Circuit, in Trio Process v. L. Goldstein's Son's, Inc. ,64 upheld
an award of interest from the date of infringement, viewing the award as
proper when applied to primary, but not punitive, damages. 65 The in-
fringed patent was a process of removing insulation from copper wires for
salvage purposes. A license rate had been established by Trio in the mar-
ket, and the court found that the rate had not been lower than reason-
able because of Goldstein's ongoing infringement. 66 In Marvel Specialy
Co. v. Bell Hosiery Mills, Inc. ,67 the Fourth Circuit also allowed interest
from the date that royalty payments should have been made. 68 The in-
fringed patent was for use of a method and machine for repairing "pul-
led threads" in knitted fabrics. The court held that the patentee was
entitled to damages on the basis of gross rental per month for the period
of infringement with interest from the date the royalty payments should
have been made. 69 The court also noted that the legislative history of
Section 284 showed that allowance of interest from the time of each in-
fringement had been contemplated and was expected.70
In Milgo Electronic Corp. v. United Business Communications, Inc. ,71 a case
involving intentional and willful disregard of the patentee's rights, the
Tenth Circuit stated that while interest could normally be awarded only
from the date a claim was liquidated, this was not true in patent cases. 2
The court held that Section 284 gave the trial court discretion to award
interest from the date of the last infringement and upheld the award of
interest in the case as UBC had not shown abuse of discretion. 73 The
Sixth Circuit has also viewed interest awards as being within the discre-
tion of the district court. In General Electric Co. v. Sciaky Bros. , Inc. 74 the
court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court when interest was
allowed to run from the date of the filing of the Master's report. 75 The
Master had found willful and deliberate infringement by GE of patents
63 Id.
64 638 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1981).
65 Id at 662-63. Damages based on a reasonable royalty are primary damages. Punitive
damages are those determined by applying a multiplier, based on such things as the willfulness
or bad faith of the infringer, to the primary damages. Increases in the primary damages can,
however, serve a remedial, rather than only a punitive purpose in some circumstances. Prejudg-
ment interest can be allowed on primary or remedial damages, but not on punitive damages.
Id.
66 612 F.2d 1353, 1358-59 (3d Cir. 1980),cer. denied, 449 U.S. 827 (1980). See discussion at
note 35 supra.
67 386 F.2d 287 (4th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1030 (1968).
68 Id at 290-91.
69 Id at 290.
70 Id at 290, n.3.
71 415 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1969).
72 Id. at 667-68.
73 Id at 668.
74 623 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980).
75 Id at 1077.
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relating to welding machine manufacturing.?6
While these courts did not hold rigidly to the Duplate standard,
neither did they achieve consistent results as to when prejudgment inter-
est should be awarded. Moreover, at least two circuits have continued to
follow the Duplate standard in its entirety.
The Ninth Circuit, in Radiator Specialty Co. v. MI ek,7 7 stated that
while the question of interest from the date of infringement was not
before the court, it felt compelled to reiterate that the general rule re-
garding interest from the date of liquidation, the Duplate rule, was still
the law of that circuit. 78 The Seventh Circuit also continued to apply
the Duplate rule. In Wahl v. Carrier Manufacturng Co. ,79 the court upheld a
decision in which interest was to run from the date damages were liqui-
dated.80 The court specifically stated that the Duplate rule should be ap-
plied.8 1 In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Zenith Radio Corp. ,82 the Seventh
Circuit additionally noted that under Duplate, "[e]xceptional circum-
stances justifying an award of prejudgment interest have been found in
relatively few cases," and "require a clear showing of bad faith or fraud,
which would consitute a gross injustice if not remedied."' 83 The court
also stated that it would decline to change the law of the circuit to be
consistent with other circuits regarding interest awards prior to the date
of liquidation.8 4
The trial courts that have allowed interest to be awarded from the
date of infringement have held that the decision is within their discre-
tion, and few of these decisions have been overturned by appellate
courts.8 5 Even though some of the circuits permitted prejudgment inter-
est, it was seldom awarded. Prejudgment interest was viewed by only a
few courts as essential to "accomplish complete justice," or to provide
fair or entire compensation to a recovering plaintiff. It is this view that
was changed by the decision in Devex.
The Devex decision serves to provide complete and just compensa-
tion to patent owners whose patents have been infringed. It is based
primarily on economic interests and policy considerations for the purpose
of encouraging proper patent licensing and use. It recognizes the abuses
76 Id
77 395 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1968).
78 Id at 764.
79 511 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1975).
80 Id. at 215.
81 Id.
82 537 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1976).
83 Id at 897.
84 Id.
85 See, e.g., General Electric, 623 F.2d at 1077 (no abuse of discretion when interest was
allowed to run only from the date the Master's report was filed); Georgi;-Paciftc, 446 F.2d at 302
(no abuse of discretion when no interest allowed); Migo Electronic, 415 F.2d at 668 (award of
interest upheld as being within discretion of the trial court). But see Marvel Specialty, 386 F.2d at
291 (appellate court awarded interest from date gross royalty was payable rather than from date
Master's report was filed).
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that occur because of the courts' refusals to grant awards of prejudgment
interest as a matter of course.
Prejudgment interest had earlier been viewed as a penalty based on
the infringer's conduct, rather than as a component of damages. With
the Devex decision, however, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
prejudgment interest is no longer to be tied to the infringer's conduct,
but instead can be viewed as "delay damages" and should be awarded in
order to effect full compensation to the patentee.8 6 Under the common
law standard, where both the infringer's profits and the injured party's
damages could be awarded to the injured party, awarding the infringer's
profits had the practical effect of compensating the injured party for at
least part of the loss of use of the royalties. Even if the infringement
caused no injury, the pre-1946 standard forced the infringer to disgorge
the fruits of the infringement, thus preventing him from being in a better
position after the infringement than he had been before it.8 7 The Devex
decision should insure that similar results are consistently reached in fu-
ture patent infringement cases.
The Court's refusal to set out more clearly the instances in which
prejudgment interest should not be awarded may result in some confu-
sion, but it may also be a significant indication that the Court intends
the threshold for establishing exceptional circumstances to be a high one.
The Court has shifted the burden of proof of establishing exceptional
circumstances from the injured plaintiffs onto the infringers.
The Devex holding should encourage to plaintiffs to bring suit and to
fully litigate their claims.88 An award of prejudgment interest can add
substantially to the total award for a patent infringement and may serve
as an incentive to pursue litigation. Indeed, in this case the award of
prejudgment interest was larger than the damages figure for royalties.8 9
The decision will encourage early settlement of cases in order to avoid
large awards of prejudgment interest. Alleged patent infringers will now
have to weigh seriously the possibility of an award of prejudgment inter-
est in deciding what course of action to follow when faced with a
complaint.
The Devex decision strengthens the position of patent owners, but by
allowing for consideration of exceptional circumstances 'it does not over-
balance decisions in their favor. Moreover, the initial costs of bringing
86 Devex, 103 S. Ct. at 2062-63 n.1; see also D. DOBBS, supra note 3; Note, supra note 3.
87 See Devex, 103 S. Ct. at 2062; Tilghman, 125 U.S. at 145-46.
88 A public function is served by patent litigation. Devex, 103 S. Ct. at 2064 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). It protects valuable inventions and prevents worthless patents from repressing
competition. Pope Manufacturing Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892). It also provides
"full and free competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain."
Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).
89 See Devex, 103 S. Ct. at 2060. The Third Circuit had noted, "Moreover, where, as here,
the interest is as much as or more than the royalties, a failure to award interest from the date of
infringement would mean that the losing defendant actually gains from the infringement and
the lengthy litigation." Devex, 667 F.2d at 364 n.17.
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suit and the usual need for a report by a special master regarding in-
fringement and damages issues prior to final adjudication make it un-
likely that frivolous patent infringement suits would be brought in hopes
of a settlement prior to trial.
The Supreme Court's decision in this case, which alters the rule re-
garding prejudgment interest in most circuits, is a sound and well-rea-
soned one. By allowing prejudgment interest awards once infringement
is found, it places the burden on the infringer to show why prejudgment
interest should not be awarded, rather than penalizing the already in-
jured party by refusing to make an award.
-JANE E. GWINER
